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Аннотация: Статья посвящена инициативе «Трех морей», основателями которой являют-
ся Республика Хорватия и Республика Польша. Проект был официально основан в 2015 г., 
а его главная цель — развивание сотрудничества в областях энергетики и транспорта меж-
ду государствами-членами. В статье особое внимание уделяется вопросу развития энер-
гетического сектора Республики Хорватия в рамках инициативы, которое прежде всего 
можно осуществить через строение терминала сжиженного газа на острове Крк в Хорва-
тии. Кроме того, в статье обсуждаются положительные и отрицательные аспекты данной 
инициативы, которая включает в себя 12 стран центральной и восточной Европы, и дея-
тельность которой привлекла внимание как западных государств-членов Евросоюза, так 
и США и России. Участие Хорватии в инициативе «Трех морей» как одного из инициа-
торов проекта является самым важным шагом в развитии внешней политики государства, 
и при успешной имплементации, даст ему возможность укрепить свою геополитическую 
позицию в Европе.
Ключевые слова: Хорватия, внешняя политика, инициатива «Трех морей», Евросоюз, 
энергетика, терминал сжиженного газа
Для цитирования: Зубович М. Инициатива «Трех морей»: перспективы развития энер-
гетического сектора в рамках хорватской внешней политики. Проблемы постсоветского 
пространства. 2019;6(1):84-91. DOI: https://doi.org/10.24975/2313-8920-2019-6-1-84-91
Статья поступила 11.01.2019 
Принята в печать 22.01.2019 
Опубликована 12.03.2019
Проблемы постсоветского пространства / Post-Soviet Issues
85
Марта Зубович, 
«Инициатива "Трех морей": перспективы развития энергетического сектора 
в рамках хорватской внешней политики»
2019 6(1):84-91
«The Three Seas Initiative»: Perspectives of Energy 
Sector Development within the Croatian Foreign Policy
Marta Zubovic
Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia,  
zubovicmarta@gmail.com
Abstract: The article revolves around the Three Seas Initiative, a project launched in 2015 by 
the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Poland, aimed at the development of cooperation 
and international relations between its 12 member states in the sphere of energy, digitalization 
and transport. Special emphasis is put on the development of Croatia’s foreign policy in the 
energy sector within the aforementioned Initiative, which can be achieved through the country’s 
participation in the construction of an LNG terminal on the island of Krk in Croatia. Moreover, 
both positive and negative aspects of the Initiative are presented in the article, considering the 
fact it has attracted not only the attention of western EU countries, but also the United States and 
Russia. Croatia’s participation in the projects of the Three Seas Initiative as one of its founders 
is considered to be one of the biggest steps in the country’s recent foreign policy, and if suc-
cessfully put into practice, the Initiative could provide Croatia an opportunity to strengthen its 
geopolitical position in Europe.
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The “Three Seas Initiative”, also referred to 
as the “Baltic-Adriatic-Black Sea Initiative” is 
an international platform which aims to en-
courage and develop international relations 
and cooperation in the sphere of digitalization, 
infrastructure and energy [1] between its 12 
member states — Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia [2]. Тhe Initiative was started by the 
Croatian president Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović 
and the Polish president Andrzej Duda in 2015 
as the “Baltic-Adriatic Initiative”. As Bul-
garia and Romania joined the project, it was 
renamed into the “Baltic-Adriatic-Black Sea 
Initiative”, consequently becoming known as 
“the Three Seas Initiative” (3SI, TSI) [3]. 
The main aim of the Initiative is to strength-
en the economic and infrastructural relations 
between the aforementioned countries, simul-
taneously creating a strong link throughout 
Central and Eastern Europe. Even though the 
project presupposes the cooperation in var-
ious fields, one of the most focused on and 




discussed is the field of energy and energy se-
curity, in the context of which Croatia has the 
potential to become an important energy hub 
in Europe by constructing an LNG terminal on 
the island of Krk, as well as by its participa-
tion in the Ionian-Adriatic Pipeline (IAP) pro-
ject [4], the majority of which is to run along 
the Croatian coastline [5].
The idea for the Initiative was first intro-
duced by Grabar-Kitarović in 2015 at the 
United Nations General Assembly in New 
York, and the meeting with Andrzej Duda that 
followed just further emphasized the willing-
ness of the countries to collaborate [6]. In just 
under a year from the aforementioned meeting, 
the first forum of the 3SI member countries 
was held in Dubrovnik, Croatia (August 25-
26, 2016), under the slogan „Strenghtening 
Europe: Connecting North and South“. A joint 
declaration was signed by the representatives 
of all the 12 countries, determining the frame-
work of the Initiative [7]. 
The summit in Warsaw in 2017, the honor-
ary guest of which was the American president 
Donald Trump and who openly expressed his 
support for the project [8], can be considered 
as one of the key moments for the 3SI. This 
undoubtedly accentuated the geopolitical im-
portance of the Initiative and simultaneously 
stirred up uneasiness among certain European 
countries (particularly Germany and Russia). 
Basically, Trump’s presence at the summit 
in Warsaw was perceived as an American at-
tempt to divide the EU and to create its „Tro-
jan horse“ on the European territory - these 
accusations have been firmly refuted by Gra-
bar-Kitarović, who pointed out that the main 
aims of the Initiative were of economic, and 
not political nature [9].
However, the political aspect could not have 
been avoided. In his speech at the Warsaw 
summit, Trump placed great emphasis on the 
willingness of the United States to collabo-
rate and support the Initiative specifically in 
the sphere of energy and energy security, ex-
pressing his country’s intentions and readiness 
to provide the 3SI countries with alternative 
sources of energy. In this way, according to 
Trump, they would never again be in a posi-
tion to be held to ransom „to a single supplier 
of energy“. In other words — American sup-
port to the Initiative was a way of showing 
muscle to Russia, on whose gas depend the 
majority of 3SI member countries [7].
Republic of Croatia plays an important role 
in this project.  It joined the EU relatively re-
cently and the launch of the 3SI on its initia-
tive is perhaps one of the biggest international 
and multilateral steps in the country’s foreign 
policy. It may serve as a stepping stone for the 
further development and recognition of Croa-
tia’s (geo)political identity [1], and as it was 
already mentioned, the field of energy and en-
ergy security are the two spheres in which this 
can be achieved particularly successfully. 
IONIAN-ADRIATIC PIPELINE AND LNG 
TERMINAL: STRATEGIC AND GEOPOLITICAL 
IMPORTANCE
The escalation of the political situation in 
Ukraine in 2014 resulted in economic and po-
litical sanctions to Russia on behalf of the EU 
and the USA. Inevitably, this was reflected on 
the energy market as well — one aspect of the 
sanctions was related to the suspension of the 
South Stream pipeline construction, a project 
which was to enable the transportation of gas 
from the Black Sea to Southeastern Europe. 
The facts that the majority of Russian gas is 
transported to southern Europe via Ukraine 
and that Russia plans to halt these transpor-
tation directions by 2019, surely contribute 
to destabilization of energy supply in the re-
gion and serve as a wake-up call for European 
countries, who are now forced to secure addi-
tional sources of energy [10].
Project entitled Ionian-Adriatic Pipeline 
(IAP) revolves around the idea of connecting 
the gas transportation system in the Republic 
of Croatia throughout Montenegro and Alba-
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nia with the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). Its 
5 billion m3/year capacity would provide Al-
bania, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Croatia with natural gas supplies. This 
would allow a new energy corridor in South-
eastern Europe to be opened, which would be 
supplied with natural gas from the Caspian re-
gion and Middle East [11]. 
The realization of this project is of great ge-
opolitical importance for Croatia. The project 
TAP, and consequently, IAP, aim to diminish 
European dependence on Russian gas, and the 
fact that Croatia is the only EU country on this 
route with an already built gas infrastructure 
gives it immense comparative advantage [12]. 
It is expected that IAP would connect the 
city of Ploče in Croatia with the Albanian 
city of Fiere, from where it would continue 
towards its connection to Trans-Adriatic Pipe-
line. The implementation of this project would 
form the conditions for the development of a 
natural gas market in the Balkans [13].
The importance of the IAP project and the 
support it received from the EU carries politi-
cal weight when it comes to relations with Rus-
sia, as well as the western member states of the 
EU, which are highly dependent on Russian 
gas. Undoubtedly, the Russian Federation is 
the primary source of energy for Europe, espe-
cially natural gas, and it continues to hold this 
position despite the decrease in demand which 
started in 2014. However, it is not only Europe 
who is dependent on the Russian gas — the 
export of gas into Europe makes around 2/3 of 
Russian export in general, as well as half of 
the country’s state budget income [10].  
The second strategically important project 
for Croatia and its geopolitical development 
is the construction of an LNG terminal on 
the island of Krk. Construction of this termi-
nal opens up a new supply corridor of natu-
ral gas for Croatia, which would increase the 
energy security not only of the country itself, 
but also the whole region [14]. The terminal 
would have the potential to be connected to 
the aforementioned IAP [15]. At the energy se-
curity conference which took place in Zagreb 
in 2018, the Lithuanian minister of energy em-
phasized the importance of diversification in 
this field, since energy monopolization, as is 
it the case with Russia, leads to the increase 
in prices, and the construction of the terminal 
would improve the overall situation on the Eu-
ropean energy market. [6]. 
However, the construction of the LNG ter-
minal on the island of Krk faced serious crit-
icism and revolt among the local community. 
The criticism is mainly of enviromental nature, 
even though LNG Croatia had „properly ad-
dressed all concerns about protection of the 
environment [17]. “ However, the local com-
munity fears the construction of the terminal 
would increase the risk of sea pollution and 
the effects it may have on sea life and tourism, 
which remains the most important and profit-
able aspect of Croatian economy. Moreover, 
the critics are troubled by the use of chlorine 
in the sea water during the process of con-
version of liquified gas, in order to cool the 
water and to protect the pipes. The Croatian 
government has announced the proposed im-
plementation of a special law in order to speed 
up the construction of the terminal, which has 
also become a subject of criticism — as stat-
ed by the enviromentalist group Eko Kvarner, 
the law restricts democratic rights of the local 
community. In their opinion, it is not neces-
sary to fully abandon the project, but rather to 
improve it and make it safer for the environ-
ment. One of the ways in which this could be 
done is by constructing an on-shore terminal, 
but this proposal is unlikely to be accepted, 
since such terminal is more expensive and its 
construction takes longer [17]. In addition, the 
local community has expressed its fear of an 
ecological catastrophe in the form of an explo-
sion or a fire either on the terminal or one of 
the ships intended for the transportation of the 
gas. However, the experts claim such risks are 




minimal due to the strict safety conditions un-
der which LNG terminals operate [18].
The second problem the LNG terminal 
project has to face is the lack of funding and 
investors. The construction of the terminal 
has been on the agenda from 1980s, and the 
biggest step in the right direction was obtain-
ing the €125 million from the EU, since the 
project was recognized as a strategically im-
portant one for the whole Union. However, it 
should be emphasized that — as important for 
the development of the project as they are — 
EU funds are not sufficient. It unlikely that the 
private sector is going to engage in this regard, 
so the rest of the funding is expected to be 
covered either from the region, or from certain 
countries which are the most to gain from the 
project — Croatia, Hungary and Ukraine [19]. 
As it is emphasized in the current Croatian En-
ergy Strategy, it is hard to predict the structure 
of future investors, since most of the invest-
ments are going to depend on the market, but 
it is estimated that approx. 2/3 of them will be 
made by domestic investors, and 1/3 by for-
eign ones [20].
Taking into consideration all of the afore-
mentioned facts, it can be concluded that the 
LNG terminal project on the island of Krk 
currently carries far greater potential than the 
IAP project. The latter, even though it could 
be very beneficial for the energy security de-
velopment not only in Croatia, but also its 
neighbouring countries, is still in a negotiating 
phase and not much has been done on the Cro-
atian territory for its actual implementation. 
The LNG terminal project — although slow-
ly — has progressed over the years, and it will 
be interesting to observe its further develop-
ment. The latest updates show that LNG Adria, 
the company in charge of the construction of 
the terminal, has purchased a Norwegian Go-
lar Power liquefied natural gas carrier, which 
will be converted into a floating storage and 
regasification unit (FSRU) and positioned at 
the future terminal [21]. Assuming all the oth-
er obstacles, both financial and local commu-
nity-related, are resolved in the near future, the 
LNG terminal could become one of the key el-
ements not only within the 3SI, but also in the 
development of Croatia’s foreign policy. 
CRITICISM 
Despite all the economic and political ad-
vantages and perspectives the Initiative carries, 
there are certain aspects which are subject to 
criticism and should be taken into consider-
ation. It was already mentioned that the 3SI 
is often perceived as a way to divide Europe 
instead of unify it, and the USA undoubted-
ly play the biggest role in this respect. Even 
though the assumptions about 3SI being an 
American “Trojan horse” on the European ter-
ritory have been denied, it is impossible not 
to notice the way in which America is using 
the project to establish itself as a direct com-
petition to Russia in the sphere of energy in 
Europe. However, Russian gas has one great 
advantage in comparison to American LNG 
— it is much cheaper [22], and it would be in-
teresting to observe how Poland and the Bal-
tic countries — which have already started 
importing American gas [22] - will cope with 
American prices in the future. 
On the other hand, Trump’s support for the 
3SI has probably very little to do with the In-
itiative itself, but should be observed in the 
context of currently tense relations between 
Washington, Berlin and Moscow. Therefore, 
Trump’s participation in the Warsaw summit 
was a way for him to show that the USA still 
has allies in Europe, and that the German-Rus-
sian North Stream 2 project does not have to 
be a primary supply of energy on the continent.
As far as Croatia is concerned, the 3SI is the 
first European initiative in which the country 
established itself as one of the initiators, but 
it is questionable whether it will have the po-
litical and economic strength to carry through 
without becoming a “victim” in the further ge-
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opolitical conflict between the USA, Germany 
and Russia [23].
However, prior to turning its attention to 
the development of its foreign policy and the 
projects within it — 3SI included — Repub-
lic of Croatia has to solve one of its problems 
which greatly influences any kind of progress 
in the sphere of international relations: its do-
mestic policy and the relations within it. Over 
the last few years, there have been various 
disagreements between the president Kolinda 
Grabar-Kitarović and the prime minister An-
drej Plenković, most of which are connected 
precisely with the question of the country’s 
foreign policy and the direction in which it is 
to develop [24]. 
Secondly, it is obvious that Poland has far 
greater ambitions to position itself as a center 
of geopolitical and energy power in Europe 
than Croatia does. According to some beliefs, 
the 3SI is just another form of re-establishing 
the historical Polish idea of “Intermarium”, in-
troduced by Jozef Klemens Pilsudski after the 
First World War. His intention was to create 
a Central-Eastern-European Federation, with 
Poland being its most prominent member, in 
order to diminish the influence of the Russian 
Empire. Geographically, “Intermarium” was to 
cover the same area as the 3SI does today, with 
the addition of Finland, Belarus and Ukraine 
[1]. Today, Poland — as the biggest Slavic 
country in the EU — has the ambitions of us-
ing the 3SI to turn itself into a new gas hub, at 
the same time importing expensive American 
LNG. Moreover, Poland is driven by the idea 
that it could replace Russia as a supplier of 
gas to Ukraine. However, it is more likely that 
Poland is being manipulated by Washington in 
the light of the American attempts to increase 
its global energy influence by turning Croatia 
and Poland into energy hubs for import of their 
expensive liquefied gas [25].
Another problem with the Initiative could 
be the fact that Poland, as one of its initiators, 
is currently led by a far-right government and 
the Euroscepticism in the country is becoming 
more and more prominent [26].  This, along 
with the anti-Russian atmosphere in Poland, 
serves as a good basis for the USA to imple-
ment its geopolitical strategy of further dis-
tancing eastern and western EU member states, 
and diminishing Russian influence on the Eu-
ropean energy market. 
CONCLUSION
After joining the EU in 2013, the foreign 
policy of the Republic of Croatia has been 
mostly aimed at the more successful integra-
tion into European structures. However, over 
the last few years, it has also been faced with 
serious disagreements between the president 
Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović and the govern-
ment — while Grabar-Kitarović is more fo-
cused on the development of relations with 
the USA, the prime minister and his govern-
ment have turned more towards Bruxelles and 
strengthening the ties with Europe. This con-
flict has been lying in the core of Croatian’s 
recent foreign policy and it has affected it to a 
great extent [27]. Until Croatia’s leaders find 
a common ground in this respect, it is highly 
unlikely that the country’s foreign policy will 
start to significantly develop in any of its areas. 
This is especially unfortunate when it comes 
to the energy sector, which is, along with tour-
ism, one of the key areas for Croatian econom-
ic and geopolitical growth. The case of LNG 
terminal clearly illustrates it — the project has 
been on the agenda for almost 30 years, and 
now that it finally started to develop, it is faced 
with several problems, most of which are as-
sociated with funding. An important question 
which arises at this stage is why there has not 
been a single potential investor from the USA, 
a country which has formally given the biggest 
support for the implementation of the terminal. 
The idea of 3SI has various advantages and, 
in the case of its further development, it could 
carry big economic potential for its member 
states. However, it cannot be denied the Ini-




tiative appeared as a perfect opportunity for 
the USA to serve as its platform for the ex-
ertion of the American geopolitical strategy 
in Europe. For Croatia, this could be the big-
gest trap, in case the country finds itself in the 
middle of a conflict between the USA on one 
hand, and Russia and Germany on the other. 
In the light of Brexit, Germany takes place as 
the most economically developed country in 
the EU, and it is questionable of how wise it 
is for small countries like Croatia to run afoul 
of Berlin on one hand, and Moscow on the 
other. Croatia has always had strong economic 
ties with Germany and the economic relations 
with Russia have started to improve [28], so 
Croatia should consider not turning its back on 
these two important strategic partners for the 
sake of the USA, currently led by a president 
whose actions and statements often question 
his credibility.
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